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SHORT-NOTICE TERMINATION CLAUSES




The effect of clauses providing for termination without cause
on short-notice in coal leases' on percentage depletion 2 has been
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law; B.A.,
1960 Washington & Lee University;, L.L.B., 1965 Washington & Lee University;
L.L.M. (Taxation), 1966 New York University.
One of the difficulties in this area is determining whether the arrangement
in question gave the taxpayer any interest in the coal in place. This problem is
discussed in the body of this article and centers on whether the purported lease
was a traditional bona fide lease or created some other form of legal relationship
between the parties. At this point in the article the term "lease" is used loosely to
refer to the legal relationship established between owners or sublessors of coal and
the parties with whom they have made certain legal arrangements.
For a very recent article addressing this problem, see Bulleit, A Tax Incentive
Approach to the Depletion Allowance Dilemma, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 1115 (1980).
See also Coggin, Federal Income Tax Treatment of the Acquisition and Disposi-
tion of Coal Interests: An Examination of I.R.C. § 631(c), 82 W. VA. L. Rpv. 1139
(1980).
2 The depletion deduction is permitted generally by § 611 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. (Section references in this article will be to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, unless otherwise noted.) The per-
tinent provisions of § 611 are the following.
(a) General Rule-In the case of mines, oil and gas wells, other natural
deposits, and timber, there shall be allowed as a deduction in computing
taxable income a reasonable allowance for depletion and for deprecia-
tion of improvements, according to the peculiar conditions in each case;
such reasonable allowance in all cases to be made under regulations pre-
scribed by Secretary. For purposes of this part, the term "mines" in-
cludes deposits of waste or residue, the extraction of ores or minerals
1
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the subject of considerable litigation since the United States Su-
from which is treated as mining under section 613(c). In any case in
which it is ascertained as a result of operations or of development work
that the recoverable units are greater or less than the prior estimate
thereof, then such prior estimate (but not the basis for depletion) shall
be revised and the allowance under this section for subsequent taxable
years shall be based on such revised estimate.
(b) Special Rules-
(1) Leases-In the case of a lease, the deduction under this sec-
tion shall be equitably apportioned between the lessor and lessee.
§ 613 provides for percentage depletion with the general rule set forth in subsec-
tion (a):
(a) General Rule-In the case of the mines, wells, and other natural
deposits listed in subsection (b), the allowance for depletion under sec-
tion 611 shall be the percentage, specified in subsection (b), of the gross
income from the property excluding from such gross income an amount
equal to any rents or royalties paid or incurred by the taxpayer in re-
spect of the property. Such allowance shall not exceed 50 percent of the
taxpayer's taxable income from the property (computed without allow-
ance for depletion). For purposes of the preceding sentence, the allowa-
ble deductions taken into account with respect to expenses of mining in
computing the taxable income from the property shall be decreased by
an amount equal to so much of any gain which (1) is treated under sec-
tion 1245 (relating to gain from disposition of certain depreciable prop-
erty) as ordinary income, and (2) is properly allocable to the property.
In no case shall the allowance for depletion under section 611 be less
than it would if computed without reference to this section.
Under § 613(b)(4) the rate of percentage depletion for coal is 10%.
The general guidelines for determining depletion are found in Treasury Regu-
lation § 1.611-1 (Regulation sections hereinafter cited will be to Treasury Regula-
tions unless otherwise noted.), the pertinent parts of which are quoted here:
§ 1.611-1 Allowance of deduction for depletion.
(a) Depletion of mines, oil and gas wells, other natural deposits,
and timber-(1) In general. Section 611 provides that there shall be al-
lowed as a deduction in computing taxable income in the case of mines,
oil and gas wells, other natural deposits, and timber, a reasonable allow-
ance for depletion. In the case of standing timber, the depletion allow-
ance shall be computed solely upon the adjusted basis of the property.
In the case of other exhaustible natural resources the allowance for de-
pletion shall be computed upon either the adjusted depletion basis of
the property (see section 612, relating to cost depletion) or upon a per-
centage of gross income from the property (see section 613, relating to
percentage depletion), whichever results in the greater allowance for de-
pletion for any taxable year. In no case will depletion based upon dis-
covery value be allowed.
2
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preme Court decided Parsons v. Smith3 in 1959. The most recent
(2) See § 1.611-5 for methods of depreciation relating to im-
provements connected with mineral or timber properties.
(3) See paragraph (d) of this section for definition of terms.
(b) Economic Interest. (1) Annual depletion deductions are allowed
only to the owner of an economic interest in mineral deposits or stand-
ing timber. An economic interest is possessed in every case in which the
taxpayer has acquired by investment any interest in mineral in place or
standing timber and secures, by any form of legal relationship, income
derived from the extraction of the mineral or severance of the timber, to
which he must look for a return of his capital. For an exception in the
case of certain mineral production payments, see section 636 and the
regulations thereunder. A person who has no capital investment in the
mineral deposit or standing timber does not possess an economic inter-
est merely because through a contractual relation he possesses a mere
economic or pecuniary advantage derived from production. For example,
an agreement between the owner of an economic interest and another
entitling the latter to purchase or process the product upon production
or entitling the latter to compensation for extraction or cutting does not
convey a depletable economic interest. Further, depletion deductions
with respect to an economic interest of a corporation are allowed to the
corporation and not to its shareholders.
(2) No depletion deduction shall be allowed the owner with re-
spect to any timber, coal, or domestic iron ore that such owner has dis-
posed of under any form of contract by virtue of which he retains an
economic interest in such timber, coal, or domestic iron ore, if such dis-
posal is considered a sale of timber, coal or domestic iron ore under sec-
tion 631(b) or (c).
3 359 U.S. 215 (1959). Parsons was not the first case to wrestle with the ter-
minability question.
In Stilwell v. United States, 250 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1957), involving contract
miners, the facts indicated that the oral contracts were not terminable at the will
of the coal owner. Based largely on that fact, the contract miner was held to have
an economic interest in the coal.
In Weirton Ice and Coal Supplies Co. v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 531 (4th Cir.
1956), though either party could terminate the contract on 90 days' notice, the
contract miner was held to have an economic interest. The emphasis on termina-
tion was minimal, however, because the power to terminate was never exercised
during the taxable years in question. Id. at 535.
In Commissioner v. Mammoth Coal Co., 229 F.2d 535 (3rd Cir. 1955), cert.
denied 352 U.S. 824, the contract with the strip miner could be terminated only
for cause. Based on that fact as well as others, the stripper was held to have an
economic interest.
In Usibelli v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1955), the contract could
be terminated at the discretion of the federal government. That fact, coupled with
others, was enough for the court to hold that the contractors had no economic
interest. It should be noted that all these cases, including Parsons v. Smith, 359
3
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decision dealing with this problem is Swank v. United States,4
U.S. 215 (1959), involved contract miners rather than persons owning bona fide
leasehold interests in the coal.
In 1950 the Internal Revenue Service issued G.C.M. 26290, 1950-1 C.B. 42,
declared obsolete in Rev. Rul. 70-277, 1970-1 C.B. 280, explaining under what cir-
cumstances contractors, as opposed to lessees, would be considered as having an
economic interest. The contract miners would not have an economic interest if the
contracts were terminable at the will of the owners or on short notice without
cause. If a year's notice was required, generally an otherwise "valid" economic
intgrest would not be destroyed. If less than a year's notice was required or the
contract could be terminated at will, then the contractor would not have an eco-
nomic interest.
This attempt by the Service to place contract coal miners on an equal footing
with bona fide coal lessees, using terminability as part of the test, appears to be
the first time termination was introduced into the economic interest arena. It was
done to bring contractors who otherwise would not have had an economic interest
within that term (at the same time giving this test no application to holders of
leasehold interests). Yet later the Service used terminability as a weapon to deny
depletion to bona fide lessees who unquestionably had investments in coal in
place. See Bakertown Coal Co. v. United States, 485 F.2d 633, 638 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
It is quite probable that this attempt to expand the concept of economic interest
arose out of a great deal of political pressure in the early 1950's when Congress
felt that the coal industry needed a boost. It was in 1951 that both the percentage
depletion rate for coal was increased from 5% to 10% and the special capital gains
treatment for coal royalties was introduced into the law in what is now § 631(c).
Revenue Act of 1951, P.L. 183, §§ 319, 325, at 497 & 501.
H.R. 586, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) reporting on the Revenue Act of 1951,
bears the following statements regarding percentage depletion for coal and capital
gain treatment for coal royalties:
I. Percentage Depletion
Under existing law depletion based on cost is available to all mining
industries and in addition percentage depletion is available to oil, gas,
sulfur, metal mines, and certain nonmetallic minerals. The allowable
rate of percentage depletion is 5 percent in the case of coal, and 15 per-
cent in the case of the other non-metallic minerals except sulfur which is
allowed 23 percent.
The testimony received by this committee both in connection with
this bill and the bill which became the Revenue Act of 1950 revealed
that in a number of cases nonmetallic minerals which are not in the
enumerated group under existing law are competitive with those receiv-
ing percentage depletion, or have just as good a claim for such treatment
as the enumerated minerals. The testimony also indicated that the 5
percent rate allowed coal is of little practical value, and that the coal
mining industry is peculiarly in need of more favorable tax treatment
because of the inroads which alternative sources of energy, particularly
oil and gas, have made on the potential markets of coal.
Section 304 of this bill adds to the list of nonmetallic minerals to
[Vol. 83
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which was decided by the United States Court of Claims on July
which percentage depletion is available at a 15 percent rate, borax,
fuller's earth, tripoli, refractory and fire clay, quartzite, perlite, diatoma-
ceous earth, and metallurgical and chemical grade limestones. The
amendment also makes it clear that the 15 percent rate applies to
thenardite, whether or not obtained from brines, or mixtures of brine.
The bill increases the percentage allowed in the case of coal from 5
to 10 percent, and sets up a new group of minerals to which percentage
depletion is available at the rate of 5 percent. This group consists of
sand, gravel, stone, pumice, scoria, and slate, brick and the tile clay,
shale, oyster shell, clam shell, granite, marble, and asbestos.
Most of these changes would have been made under the House ver-
sion of the bill which became the Revenue Act of 1950 but they were
eliminated from the final legislation largely because of the revenue loss
involved. It is apparent, however, that the need for equalization is sub-
stantially greater now because of the additional taxes imposed under the
legislation of 1950 and under this bilL Therefore, the committee believes
that the proposed extension of the percentage depletion system is neces-
sary in spite of the revenue loss involved. The latter is estimated to be
about $67 million in a full year's operation.
The amendments made by this section of the bill apply to taxable
years beginning after December 31, 1950.
H. Coal Royalties
Section 307 of this bill provides tax relief for the recipients of coal
royalties. Most leases on coal properties are long-term and call for roy-
alty payments expressed in cents per ton. Therefore, the lessor does not
receive the automatic adjustment for price changes which occurs when a
royalty is expressed as a percentage of the value of the mineral ex-
tracted from the property. Many of the existing coal leases are old and
the royalty payment called for under them is small.
It is reported also that as a practical matter the lessor of a coal
property is not likely to benefit from percentage depletion even under
the new 10 percent rate provided in this bill, although it is anticipated
that this rate will be of material benefit to the coal operators.
Section 307 extends to the recipients of coal royalties the capital-
gains treatment now available to timber under section 117(k)(2) of the
Internal Revenue Code. It is intended by this provision that coal royal-
ties receive the same treatment as timber royalties. In the case of timber
coming under this section percentage depletion is not allowed, and it
also will not be available in the case of these coal royalties.
Section 307 applies to taxable years ending after December 31,
1950, but only with respect to amounts received or accrued after such
date.
The revenue loss involved is estimated to be about $10 million
annually.
1951-2 C.B. 378-80.
While the posture which the Internal Revenue Service took in this situation
1980]
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18, 1979. In Swank, the Court of Claims reaffirmed its position
that a lessee, holding an otherwise valid legal interest in coal in
place, has an "economic interest" for percentage depletion pur-
poses. This economic interest will not be destroyed by a clause
allowing short-notice termination without cause.5 The Fifth Cir-
cuit in Winters Coal Co. v. Commissioner8 appears to agree with
the Court of Claims.
7
The United States Tax Court, however, has consistently held
against taxpayers in cases involving clauses allowing either party
to terminate on short-notice without cause.8 The Third Circuit
has affirmed this position.9
n view of this conflict between the Court of Claims and the
Fifth Circuit on the one hand and the Tax Court and the Third
Circuit on the other, the United States Supreme Court, on May
12, 1980, granted the government's petition for certiorari in
Swank.10 The only issue before the Court is the effect of a clause
providing for short-notice termination without cause by the lessor
on an otherwise valid "economic interest" in coal in place.
1
may have been for the most humane reasons, it generated a tremendous amount
of litigation, even after Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. 624
(1965).
4 602 F.2d 348 (Ct. CL 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 2150 (1980).
5 Id. at 350.
6 496 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1974).
7The Winters opinion, however, is weak on the point regarding terminability
because only one of three judges found for Winters squarely on the terminability
aspect of the lease.
$ See, e.g., Weaver v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 594 (1979) (In this case, though,
on the particular facts, one lease which was terminable at will on 120 days' notice
was held to grant the lessee an economic interest because the 120-day period was
shown to be long enough to mine the mineral to exhaustion.); Holbrook v. Com-
missioner, 65 T.C. 415 (1975); Winters Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 249
(1971), reu'd, 496 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1974); Constantino v. Commissioner, 29 TCM
189 (1970), af'd, 445 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1971); Whitmer v. Commissioner. 28 TCM
1480 (1969), aff'd, 443 F.2d 170 (3d Cir. 1971); Mullins v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.
571 (1967).
9 Costantino v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1971); Whitmer v. Com-
missioner, 443 F.2d 170 (3d Cir. 1971).
1 100 S. Ct. 2150 (1980). Argument was heard by the Court on December 9,
1980, 49 U.S.L.W. 3442 (1980).
" Pet. for Writ of Certiorari at 2.
This article focuses on the issue before the Court. That question assumes
that, but for the termination clause, the lessees have a valid economic interest.
[Vol. 83
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Swank involves three taxpayers: Rita and Elwood Swank;"
Black Hawk Coal Corporation;1 3 and Bull Run Mining Com-
pany.14 The Court of Claims, in a per curiam opinion ruling in
favor of the taxpayers, viewed the pertinent facts in each case to
be the same for the purpose of disposing of the litigation. The
court summarized these facts as follows:
Each taxpayer held a lease (or leases) of coal-bearing
property with unstated duration or duration for a term of
years-subject to the termination clause or clauses. These
leases provided for royalties (plus, in at least one of the cases,
a flat annual rent) to be paid by the lessee [footnote omitted].
Each lease contained a clause permitting either party (or the
lessor alone) to terminate the lease (and operations thereun-
der), apparently without cause, within thirty days. In each case
the plaintiffs mined coal under these leases during the taxable
years and for a substantial time before. The proceeds from the
sales of the coal represented the sole source of revenue from
which the lessees could recover any rents and royalties paid to
the lessor for the right to mine.15
The court followed its decision in Bakertown Coal Co. v.
United States," and held that "the mere existence of the unused
termination clause is not enough to deprive the taxpayer-lessees
of their 'economic interest' they would otherwise admittedly
have.M
7
In response to the government's contention that the coal-les-
sees in Swank were no different from coal contract-miners who
generally have been held not to have an economic interest in the
Therefore, discussion of what generally constitutes an economic interest is brief.
For a recent article discussing Swank, and its court of claims predecessors, as well
as the authorities in conflict with them, see Pratt and Ferguson, Depletion Deduc-
tion in Coal Leases: Courts Split on the Effect of Lease Terminability, 51 J. oF
TAx. 240 (1979).
"S Hereinafter referred to as Swank.
"3Hereinafter referred to as Black Hawk.
14 Hereinafter referred to as Bull Run. The author was on brief for Bull Run
in the proceedings on the merits before the United States Supreme Court and he
extends his deep appreciation to Woodrow A. Potesta, counsel for Bull Run, for
his incisive and helpful comments.
11 602 F.2d at 350.
If 485 F.2d 633, 638 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
17 602 F.2d at 350.
1980]
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coal in place,18 the court stated that on the records in each case it
was clear that the taxpayers had mined the coal for a substantial
period of time before the taxable years in question and that they
had good expectations of being able to continue to do so. The
court went on to say that there had been either rare, or no, exer-
cise of the termination clauses without cause, which indicated
that the coal lessees had real expectations that they could mine
the coal pursuant to their leases for a substantial amount of time
and extract most of the coal, if not all of it. Therefore, the ques-
tionable requirement of being able to mine to exhaustion was met
by the taxpayers in economic reality."' Furthermore, the court
took note of the fact that the records contained no evidence that,
were one of these leases to be cancelled upon thirty days' notice,
the coal-lessee could not have mined a substantial amount of the
coal in that period of time.
2 0
The reason for the existence of the mining-to-exhaustion re-
quirement under percentage depletion, according to the govern-
ment and as reflected in the court's opinion, was the fact that
under cost or discovery depletion it was necessary to make esti-
mates of the coal in the ground as one would do under cost or
discovery depletion. Since percentage depletion was introduced as
a substitute for cost or discovery depletion, whatever require-
ments applied to cost or discovery depletion applied as well to
percentage depletion.21 No comment was made on whether this
analysis was accurate, rather, as already discussed, the court
looked to the economic reality of the situation to dispose of that
argument.
2 2
The final point considered by the court, centered on the fact
that the taxpayers involved were the only persons entitled to the
percentage depletion allowance. Reason indicated that to deny it
to them would result in denying it to all parties, thus violating
Is Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. 624 (1965); Parsons v.
Smith, 359 U.S. 215 (1959). But see note 3, supra, for contract miner cases before
Parsons going both ways, as well as the contract miner cases decided after Par-
sons discussed in text. See also Note, 66 W. VA. L. Rnv. 41 (1963), for a summary
of some of the contract miner cases.
19 602 F.2d at 351.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 350-51.
2 Id. at 351.
[Vol. 83
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the intent of Congress. This reasoning was premised on the fact
that the lessors had treated the royalty payments under Section
631(c) as being from the sale or exchange of property, and thus,
were prohibited by the terms of that section from claiming any
percentage depletion.
2 3
In light of the foregoing introduction, the purposes of this
article are to state briefly what in general constitutes an "eco-
nomic interest" and to examine how the courts and the Treasury
have treated leases and other arrangements providing for short
notice termination without cause for the purpose of percentage
depletion. This examination results in the conclusion that the
court of claims in Swank was correct in holding that a clause pro-
viding for termination on short notice and without cause by ei-
ther party, or the lessor alone, does not preclude the lessee from
having an otherwise valid "economic interest."2'
THE GENERAL CONcEPT OF "EcONOMIC INTEREST"
The concept of an "economic interest" as a condition to tak-
ing depletion was first enunciated in Palmer v. Bender,25 in which
the Court set forth the test so often quoted:
The language of the statute is broad enough to provide, at
least, for every case in which the taxpayer has acquired, by
investment, any interest in the oil in place, and secures, by any
form of legal relationship, income derived from the extraction
of the oil, to which he must look for a return of his capital.26
The Court, in discussing United States v. Biwabik Mining Co.,27
went further to state:
But this Court held that regardless of the technical ownership
of the ore before severance, the taxpayer, by his lease, had ac-
23 Id. Because this issue does not involve the terminability problem, it is be-
yond the scope of this article.
11 At least two commentators have suggested that terminability clauses of the
type under discussion are fatal to their being an economic interest in the lessee.
McDowell, Depletable Interests: Economic Interest vs. Economic Advantage, 18
NYU TAx INsT. 517, 541 (1960); Sneed, Supreme Court Strip Mining Decisions
alter Tests for Depletable Interests, 11 J. oF TAx 2, 4 (1959); Sneed, The Eco-
nomic Interest-An Expanding Concept, 35 Trim L. REv. 307, 352 (1957).
25 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
26 Id. at 557.
27 247 U.S. 116 (1918).
1980]
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quired legal control of a valuable economic interest in the ore
capable of realization as gross income by the exercise of his
mining rights under the lease. Depletion was, therefore,
allowed."
The Palmer concept of an "economic interest," which the
Court said should be broadly construed, has been incorporated in
the Regulations. 29 Based on the Regulations and Palmer, where
the taxpayer claiming depletion must look to the market place for
a return of his capital investment, and where he holds rights to
the mineral in the ground as a lessee pursuant to a traditional
bora fide lease, the taxpayer should be entitled to the depletion
deduction. 0
EFFECT OF TERMINATION CLAUSE
a. A Non-Controlling Criteria
The United States Supreme Court never has been presented
with a case squarely involving a short-notice, without-cause ter-
mination clause where the taxpayer was clearly a bona fide lessee
as opposed to a mining contractor performing mining services for
the owner of the coal. Nor is there anything in the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954, as amended, or the Treasury Regulations to
lend guidance in this type of fact situation.
Parsons v. Smith,3 1 involving a contract-miner, is the only
case in which the Court has dealt with the effect of a short-notice
without-cause termination clause in determining whether the tax-
payer had an "economic interest." In Parsons the Court set forth
seven factors which were indicia of an "economic interest:"
To recapitulate, the asserted fiction is opposed to the facts (1)
that petitioners' investments were in their equipment, all of
which was movable-not in the coal in place; (2) that their in-
vestments in equipment were recoverable through deprecia-
tion-not depletion; (3) that the contracts were completely
terminable without cause on short notice; (4) that the land-
owners did not agree to surrender and did not actually surren-
" 287 U.S. at 557.
" See note 2 supra. § 1.611-1 (1980).
See also, Casey, The Economic Interest-Play It Again Sam, 24 TAX LAW-
Yea 129 (1970).
21 359 U.S. 215 (1959).
[Vol. 83
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der to petitioners any capital interest in the coal in place; (5)
that the coal at all times, even after it was mined, belonged
entirely to the landowners, and that petitioners could not sell
or keep any of it but were required to deliver all that they
mined to the landowners; (6) that petitioners were not to have
any part of the proceeds of the sale of the coal, but, on the
contrary, they were to be paid a fixed sum for each ton mined
and delivered, which was, as stated in Huss, agreed to be in
"full compensation for the full performance of all work and for
the furnishing of all [labor] and equipment required for the
work"; and (7) that petitioners, thus, agreed to look only to the
landowners for all sums to become due them under their
contracts.3 2
Unlike Swank, Parsons was primarily a road building con-
tractor who wanted to return to roadbuilding should the opportu-
nity present itself; hence, the termination clause. The oral agree-
ment between Parsons and the owner of the coal was that
Parsons' firm would furnish equipment at its expense, as" well as
the facilities and labor to strip mine the coal. In addition, Parsons
was to deliver the coal to the owner's cars. In return for these
services Parsons was to be paid a stated amount of money per ton
by the owner. Parsons was not permitted to keep or sell any of
the coal on the open market." Under these terms Parsons was
considered a "contract miner." The agreement concerning termi-
nation was open-ended, providing that "if Parsons or Rockhill
wanted to quit, all'that was necessary to terminate the arrange-
ment was the giving of a ten day notice.""
In the companion case of Huss v. Smith," there was a writ-
ten contract between the owner and Huss to strip mine certain
coal. As in Parsons, Huss was to furnish at its own expense all the
equipment, facilities and labor, and was to deliver all coal mined
to the owner who would pay Huss a stated amount per ton. As in
Parsons, Huss was not permitted to sell the coal on the open mar-
ket. There was a termination clause pursuant to which the owner/
lessor, at any time with thirty days' written notice, could termi-
nate the arrangement without cause. The money to be paid to
22 Id. at 225.
's Id. at 216-17.
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both Parsons and Huss by the respective owners of the coal "was
agreed to be in 'full compensation for the full performance of all
work and for the furnishing of all material, labor, power, tools,
machinery, implements and equipment required for the work'." 0
To the Parsons Court the termination clause was only one of
several factors to consider in determining whether the taxpayers
had an economic interest which would entitle them to the deple-
tion deduction. In holding against the taxpayers the Court con-
sidered all seven factors, found that the taxpayers failed them all,
and concluded that the taxpayers involved were merely contract
miners who had to look to the owners for payment for the work
done (therefore bearing no risk of the market) and thus had no
investment in the coal in place. Hence, they were paid by the coal
owners for their services of mining the coal for the owners rather
than for their own benefit.
3 7
Winters Coal Co. v. Commissioner"8 involved leases very sim-
ilar to the ones in Swank. The lease in Winters was automatically
renewable every year, but each party had the right to give thirty
days' notice of intent not to renew. Furthermore, either party had
the right to terminate at will upon sixty days' notice (subse-
quently reduced to thirty days).89 The court found (and the gov-
ernment has conceded the same in Swank)'0 that the lease con-
veyed to Winters Coal Company the leasehold rights to the coal
in place.4 1 Therefore, the only question before the court was
whether the termination clause by itself would destroy what was
clearly otherwise an economic interest.42 The court then reviewed
the Parsons criteria and determined with respect to the short-
notice without-cause termination clause: "This being the only
contra point to the vesting of an economic interest in the peti-
tioner, to say that ABC had not passed an economic interest to
Winters pursuant to the leases gallops beyond all reason and
logic.' 43
36 Id. at 218.
37 Id. at 224-26.
496 F.2d 995 (5th Cr. 1974).
S Id. at 996.
40 602 F.2d at 349.
41 496 F.2d at 999.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1000.
[Vol. 83
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In Bakertown Coal Co. v. United States,44 a case involving
leases similar to the ones in Swank, the court indicated clearly its
view that, in dealing with the seven factors set forth in Parsons,
the terminability factor was only one of several to be considered
in determining whether a taxpayer possessed an economic inter-
est so as to entitle it to the depletion allowance. The court said:
Though terminability was one of the seven disqualifying fac-
tors mentioned, it cannot be considered either in isolation or
in the abstract, as the Government would have it. Rather, it is
clear that in the context of the contractor-oriented opinion,
coming in the wake of G.C.M. 26290 and the decisions that
followed it, the matter of terminability becomes only a colora-
bly relevant factor where the applicant for the allowance lacks
the traditional qualifications for depletion, as reflected by the
other six conditions referenced by the court.
4 5
In Swank the Court of Claims followed its reasoning in
Bakertown, again holding that the Parsons criteria are a bundle
of several different factors, none of which was necessarily control-
ling. The terminability factor was not even relevant if all other six
factors were met. The government has conceded in Swank that all
other six factors have been met.
46
In Mullins v. Commissioner7 Judge Drennen in his dissent
suggested that the terminability factor is not controlling but is an
important factor to consider in determining whether a lessee
holds an economic interest. He said with respect to the so-called
Bolling lease:
I agree that the presence of a clause permitting the lessor to
terminate the lease without cause on short notice is an impor-
tant factor to be considered in determining who has the requi-
site economic interest in the coal under a lease or contract, but
I do not think it is conclusive, as does the majority [footnote
omitted]. In my opinion we should look to the overall purpose
of the depletion statute, and all the circumstances of the par-
ticular transaction, to determine how much weight to give to
the termination clause in determining who had the economic
44 485 F.2d 633 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
" Id. at 639.
" 602 F.2d at 349.
47 48 T.C. 571 (1967).
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interest in the mineral deposit.4 8
Judge Drennen's comments reflect the manner in which the Court
of Claims and the Fifth Circuit have approached this problem.
This approach is the generally accepted view of the resolution of
tax disputes; i.e., the disposition should be based in economic re-
ality and not in technical legal terms.
It is interesting to note that while the Court in Parsons did
not regard the presence of terminability as controlling, neither
did it regard the absence of terminability as controlling in Para-
gon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner.49 Yet in both cases the per-
centage depletion deduction was denied to the contract miners
involved. The denial was based, then, not on the presence or ab-
sence of a terminability clause, but on the broader and controlling
rationale that the contract miners did not have an investment in
the coal in place and did not have to look to the market for a
return of their investment. They looked only to the owners for a
set return in exchange for the service of mining.
b. Bona Fide Lessees v. Contract Miners.
By the terms of the leases" it is clear that in Swank the les-
sees obtained, by investment, interests in the coal in place by way
of their bona fide leaseholds and had to look to the open market
to recover their investment in the coal in place. 1 In other words,
3 I'd. at 584.
49 '80 U.S. 624 (1965).
" See text accompanying note 15, supra.
1 For example, pursuant to the lease in Bull Run, Preston County Coal and
Coke leased to Bull Run all of a certain tract of unmined coal and granted the
lessee the exclusive right to mine that coal. The mining had to be performed in a
good, workmanlike manner so as to mine and remove a maximum amount thereof
consistent with modern mining methods. The lessee had to mine pursuant to ex-
isting rules and regulations of the United States and West Virginia and any which
might be enacted after the effective date of the lease. The lessee also had to com-
ply with all existing workman's compensation laws and save the lessor harmless
from any liability arising out of the operation of the mine. The lessee was to oper-
ate as an independent contractor. The term of the lease was for five years with an
option in the leassee to renew for five years if the coal had not been removed by
the end of the original term. The lessee was to pay the lessor a royalty of 25 cents
per ton for the coal mined and removed. The parties agreed that upon written
notice at least thirty days prior to the effective date of the termination, either
party oould cancel the lease without cause. The lease was assignable with the prior
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the lessees bore all the risks of ownership of the minerals in place
as the only means by which they could recover their investment.
It is leases of this precise nature, under which the lessees were
really entrepreneurs, 52 that led the Court of Claims in Swank,
Thornberry Construction Co. v. United States,53 and Bakertown,
as well as the Fifth Circuit in Winters, and Judge Drennen in his
dissent in Mullins, to hold that a short-notice, without-cause ter-
mination clause will not destroy an otherwise valid economic in-
terest as long as the leasehold interest clearly represents an in-
vestment in the minerals in place.
Since Parsons, all but three of the cases holding that such a
termination clause prevents the taxpayer from having an eco-
nomic interest are distinguishable from Swank on their facts. In
those cases the taxpayer involved did not have an interest which
required him to look to production and then sale of the minerals
on the open market, where he assumed all the risks of ownership,
to recover his investment. Rather, he was performing services for
a set return per unit from the lessor or owner. The difference in
those cases is that the taxpayers were essentially performing ser-
vices for monies to be paid from other than the open market as
opposed to the lessees in Swank who were entrepreneurs looking
to recover their investments in the coal in place on the open mar-
ket with all its attendant risks.
written consent of the lessor (J.A. 94a-96a). Brief for Respondent, Bull Run at 2-3.
82 One court, at least, in a case not dealing with terminability on short-notice
without cause, characterized the one having an economic interest as an entrepre-
neur when it said: "It appears to this Court that the thread which ties the several
Parsons criteria together is the basic question whether the coal operator assumed
entrepreneurial-type obligations and risks with respect to the coal itself." Douglas
Coal Co. v. United States, 429 F. Supp. 322, 338 (N.D. W. Va. 1977). Earlier the
court had also taken the position that no single criterion in Parsons was control-
ling: "Paragon accordingly suggests that none of the seven criteria in Parsons can
be considered in isolation (citation omitted). No single criterion is controlling. In-
stead, all of 'the peculiar conditions in each case' must be examined." 429 F. Supp.
at 334.
3 576 F.2d 346 (Ct. Cl. 1978). This case involved a termination clause which
was conditioned on the happening of an event, but the termination power was not
automatic even should the lessee not sell to the person intended, for any termina-
tion power at that point was at the sole discretion of the lessor. Id. at 350.
1980]
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1. Contract miner cases.
The only case which has presented the United States Su-
preme Court with an opportunity to pass on the question of the
effect of short-notice without-cause termination clauses has been
Parsons v. Smith.5" As noted above, in that case the taxpayers
met none of the seven criteria set forth and were therefore denied
the depletion allowance because they were contract miners and
not bona fide lessees. Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner"
dealt only peripherally with the termination clause problem and
based its holding squarely on the fact that the contract miners
there did not look to the market place for a return on their
investment.56
]In United States v. Stallard7 there was a thirty-day notice
without-cause termination clause involved which was held to be
of some importance in denying the taxpayer-stripmining contrac-
tor the depletion allowance. However, the most important factor
was that the contract miner was only performing mining services
because he did not depend on the market place for a profit or
loss. Rather, he provided all the equipment and labor (very much
as occurred in Parsons), mined the coal pursuant to the agree-
ment, and then delivered it to the owner at a fixed price per ton.
That is not the case in Swank, where there were bona fide lessees
(as opposed to a contract miner), who bore the risk of profit or
loss of the open market, operated independently of the lessors,
359 U.s. 215.
380 U.s. 624.
" After an examination of the entire record, we can only conclude that
Paragon at all times retained the right to change its fixed fee at will, and
after delivery to the tipple, the contractors could only rely on Paragon's
personal covenant to pay the posted price. This is insufficient. As we
said in Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 557 (1933), the deduction is
allowed only to one who "has acquired, by investment, any interest in
the oil in place, and secures, by any form of legal relationship, income
derived from the extraction of the oil, to which he must look for a re-
turn of his capital." Here, Paragon was bound to pay the posted fee
regardless of the condition of the market at time of the particular deliv-
ery and thus the contract miners did not look to the sale of the coal for
a return of their investment, but looked solely to Paragon to abide by its
covenant.
380 U.S. at 635.
57 273 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1959).
[Vol. 83
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and were not subject to any control by the lessors. In short, the
taxpayers in Swank were not merely performing contract services
for the lessors but were the owners of the coal pursuant to the
leases and bore all the risks and responsibilities of owners of such
interests.
In McCall v. Commissioner" a thirty-day notice without-
cause termination clause was held to be the critical factor in de-
nying the depletion allowance to the taxpayer. However, the
terms of the agreement between the sublessor and the lessee/tax-
payer required the lessee to mine the coal and deliver it to the
sublessor at a set price per ton. In addition to the right of either
party to terminate without cause after thirty days' notice, the
sublessor had the right, if economic conditions prevented him
from selling at a reasonable profit the coal mined and delivered
by the mining contractor to compel the mining contractor to sus-
pend operations upon twenty-four hours' notice. Also, the subles-
sor reserved the right to stripmine coal which could not be prop-
erly mined by the mining contractor through deep mining. Those
factors are not present in Swank. The taxpayers in Swank were
bona fide lessees who had acquired the exclusive rights, without
interference or control by the lessors, to mine the coal they owned
pursuant to the leases, who bore the risks of the market as would
any owner of a leasehold interest, and who were free to sell to
anyone at any price.
United States v. Wade"9 involved a contract miner who was
paid a fixed amount for quarrying dolomite and delivering it to
the lessor. He did not rely on the open market for his profit or
loss. While the thirty-day notice without-cause termination clause
was deemed to be important, it was not the only factor which
caused the court to deny the depletion allowance. Rather, it was
one of two major factors, the other being that Wade essentially
provided a mining service.
Another thirty-day notice without-cause termination clause
case was presented to the court in Costantino v. Commissioner.0
However, under the arrangement between the mining contractor
and the owner, the mining contractor could look only to the own-
8' 312 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1963).
Of 381 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1967).
60 445 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1971).
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er for a set price per ton, thus evidencing the fact that the owner
had not parted with any interest in the mineral in place, but
rather had contracted for the "lessee" to perform a mining service
in extracting the mineral from the ground. This, in addition to
the thirty-day notice without-cause termination clause, was im-
portant in the court's decision to deny the depletion allowance to
the taxpayer. The taxpayers in Swank, on the other hand, un-
questionably owned the leasehold interest, were not under the
control of the lessors, and bore all the risks of the market to re-
cover their investment in the coal in place.
In Holbrook v. Commissioner,61 the Tax Court was faced with
another thirty-day notice, without-cause case. Under the "lease"
there, title to the coal did not pass until the coal had been re-
duced to physical possession by the lessee. This factor alone had
as much to do with the denial of the depletion allowance, if not
more, than the thirty-day notice termination clause. Furthermore,
the mining right in Holbrook was not exclusive. These facts do
not exist in Swank, thus, Holbrook is easily distinguishable.
2. Bona fide lessee cases
The three cases involving bona fide lessees, as opposed to
mining contractors, which are directly in conflict with the court of
claims opinion in Swank may be distinguishable on their facts to
some extent. However, for the purpose of this article, it is as-
sumed that they are not distinguishable, at least insofar as the
courts involved viewed the facts. The cases are Weaver v. Com-
missioner,6 2 Mullins v. Commissioner,63 and Whitmer v.
Commissioner."
Each of these cases held that the presence of a thirty-day (or
other short-term) notice without cause termination clause defeats
an economic interest. The rationale of these holdings is that no
interest in the minerals in place has been obtained by the trans-
feree because he has no right to mine to exhaustion. Therefore he
S 65 T.C. 415 (1975).
2 72 T.C. 594 (1979).
" 48 T.C. 571 (1967).
443 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1971). The Bakertown court criticizes Whitmer be-
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has no investment in the minerals in place and has not met the
first requirement of Palmer v. Bender.0 5 Palmer, however, in-
volved discovery depletion 6 which has not been permitted since
1954 . Both cost depletion and discovery depletion require an es-
timate of the amount of coal in place either at the time of
purchase or at the time of discovery, and then the deduction is
calculated on a per unit basis." Where such a depletion method is
used, it may make some sense to impose a requirement that the
person claiming the deduction be able to mine the deposit to ex-
haustion because the amount of the depletion deduction per unit
is based implicitly on that assumption. However, that is not the
case with respect to percentage depletion which has no relation to
the estimate of units of coal in the ground. 9 Though technically,
cost depletion should be calculated to determine whether it ex-
ceeds percentage depletion,"0 as a practical matter this is not
done by most taxpayers because normally, with respect to coal,
percentage depletion will exceed cost depletion. However, in de-
termining amounts to be treated as capital gain under section
631(c), cost depletion must be calculated.71
Percentage depletion operates solely as a percentage of gross
income generated through production and sale, and unlike cost
depletion, is available to the taxpayer far beyond the time when
the initial investment in the mineral has been recovered.7 2 Hence,
45 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
Id. at 554.
67 Regulation § 1.611-1(a)(1), first published in T.D. 6446, 1960-1 C.B. 208,
210.
Regulation § 1.611-2.
49 § 613(a). The appropriate rate is taken against the gross income (with some
adjustments and limitations) generated by the sale during the tax year the coal is
sold. See Rev. Rul. 76-533, 1976-2 C.B. 189 and Rev. Rul. 68-565, 1968-2 C.B. 263.
70 § 613(a).
71 For a very recent article on the operation of section 631(c) regarding re-
tained coal royalties, see Henshaw, An Analysis of the Tax Planning Opportuni-
ties Unique to the Mining of Coal, 53 J. of Tax. 357 (1980).
72 Commissioner v. S.W. Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, 312 (1956); Commis-
sioner v. Elliott Petroleum Corp., 82 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1936). See Whiteside and
Gillig, Coal and Conservation-Tax Policy, 64 Ky. L.J. 573, 584 (1975-76). For an
excellent-article on natural resource development incentives generally, including
coal, see Burke, Incentives to Develop Natural Resource Exploitation; Oil and
Gas; Hard Minerals; Timber, 33 NYU TAx INST. 1541 (1975). See also Austin,
Percentage Depletion: Its Background and History, 21 UNiv. KAN. CiTy L. REv.
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there is no reason why, with respect to allowing percentage deple-
tion, the person claiming the depletion deduction should be re-
quired to have the right to mine the deposit to exhaustion. In
fact, so long as the person claiming the depletion deduction meets
the general test of Palmer v. Bender, which is that the taxpayer
has acquired legal control of a valuable economic interest from
which he can realize gross income by exercising his mining rights,
the depletion deduction should be available." Thus, in the three
cases which are contrary to Swank, the requirement of obtaining
the right to mine to exhaustion with respect to percentage deple-
tion is misplaced through a loose application of the Palmer v.
22 (1952-53).
Percentage depletion was first enacted in 1926, Rev. Act of 1926, ch. 27, 44
Stat. 9, § 204(c)(2), but it was not until 1932 that the coal industry was permitted
to use that method of depletion at the rate of 5%. In 1951 the rate was increased
to 10%. See note 3, supra.
'13 See Thornberry Const. Co. v. United States, 576 F.2d 346; 353:
What distinguishes this case from Parsons v. Smith, supra, and
Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra
(and from other cases cited by defendant) is that, as a matter of form, of
substance, and of economic reality, the lease and assignment conferred
upon plaintiff the rights to mine coal and to sell that coal, at whatever
price it could obtain therefor, to an independent, unrelated, third party
(albeit a valued customer of AMAX itself).
Put another way, plaintiff was not simply extracting coal for AMAX
under a contract with AMAX from which it derived a pecuniary advan-
tage, but was mining coal for sale to a third party, at an independently
determined price, and was required to look to the extraction of that coal
and the sale thereof for a return on its investment and profit.
and Bakertown Coal Co. v. United States, 485 F.2d 633, 636:
Thus, defendant does not dispute either that these agreements were
bona fide mineral leases or that, while in force, they gave plaintiffs es-
sentially the same autonomous authority over extraction and sale of the
underlying mineral as did the leases in Palmer, supra, and Alworth-Ste-
phens, supra, where such authority was held to constitute an ample ba-
sis for a depletable interest.
* * * * *
The erroneous transposition is as between lessees; persons who have
acquired the right to remove and retain mineral underlying the leased
premises, and mining contractors who, although functionally involved in
the production of salable mineral (and therefore financially interested in
the life of the deposit as a source of continuing need for their services),
have no effective authority over production and acquire no ownership of
the extracted mineral.
20




Furthermore, a lease containing a clause allowing for termi-
nation for cause, does not destroy an otherwise valid economic
interest.7 5 Yet, if a lease is terminated for cause, the lessee, as in
the case of a termination without cause, will not be able to mine
the deposit to exhaustion. Thus, there is inconsistent treatment
of these two situations, unless the key difference is the fact that
the transferor has retained control over the transferee by reason
of having a power of termination on short-notice and without
cause.
Interpretations by the Internal Revenue Service of the effect
of termination clauses indicate that short-term notice without-
cause termination clauses will destroy an otherwise valid eco-
nomic interest, whether they are exercisable by the transferor of
the mineral right or an unrelated third party. In G.C.M. 26290,7
dealing with coal contract miners (as opposed to lessees), a with-
out-cause termination clause requiring a year's notice for termi-
nation was held to be of such a nature that it would not destroy
'the economic interest of a contract miner, if indeed he could have
such. The same termination clause, with notice of less than a
year, was held to defeat any possibility of an economic interest
because the transferor was not conveying an interest which would
permit the transferee to mine to exhaustion. As a result, the
transferee had no investment in the mineral in place; therefore,
the first requirement of the Palmer rule had not been met.
Strangely enough, though, in Rev. Rul. 77-4817 the Internal
7 This proposition should hold true for cost depletion as well on the theory
that mining to exhaustion is totally irrelevant to the depletion deduction. See
Wiener, Economic Interest, the Rise and Fall of a Slogan, 37 TAXEs 777, 794
(1959).
7 See Whitmer v. Commissioner, supra, at 173, and the cases cited therein.
See also Rev. Rul. 74-507, 1974-2 C.B. 179.
Is 1950-1 C.B. 42, declared obsolete in Rev. Rul. 70-277, 1970-1 C.B. 280. See
note 3, supra. See also Rev. Rul. 74-507, 1974- C.B. 179 where a year's notice still
seems to be accepted by the Service as not invalidating an otherwise valid eco-
nomic interest.
7 1977-2 C.B. 205. The Service in Rev. Rul. 77-481 stated it would not follow
Bakertown; that terminability was equally fatal to contract miners as well as les-
sees. In Rev. Rul. 77-481 a government agency contracted with a taxpayer/con-
struction company for delivery of a certain amount of rock. The taxpayer in turn
entered into a lease with a landowner for the exclusive right to remove as much
1980]
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Revenue Service took the position that if the lease could be ter-
minated by someone other than the grantor, there still was no
economic interest because of the possibility that the deposit
would not be mined to exhaustion by the lessee. The Internal
Revenue Service by taking this latter position, has invalidated the
only distinction to be drawn between termination for cause and
termination without cause. If the termination is for cause, the ra-
tionale for not having such a right destroy an otherwise valid eco-
nomic interest is that there is no retention by the transferor of
some power over the transferee. But if the termination can be ef-
fected at the will of the transferor, then the transferor has re-
tained so much control over the transferee that the transferee for
all practical purposes has acquired no substantial interest in the
coal in place.
The court in Swank pointed out that there is nothing in the
record to indicate that the coal could not have been mined to ex-
haustion within the thirty-day period7 8 Swank is not a Parsons
situation where the contract was oral with a ten-day notice of ter-
mination, primarily, because the "lessee" (Parsons), a contract
rock as he wanted for a per ton royalty, but the lease would terminate upon termi-
nation of the government contract. Furthermore, the governmental agency re-
served the right to cancel the contract at any time. Holding that the taxpayer had
no economic interest in the rock in place the ruling explained:
In the present case, although the taxpayer's right to quarry and re-
move the rock is not terminable by either the landowner or the tax-
payer-lessee, it could cease at any time as a result of the governmental
agency's termination of the governmental contract. Because the tax-
payer's rights can be frustrated by the governmental action, the tax-
payer has no significant legal or financial interest in the minerals in
place. It makes no difference whether a taxpayer's mineral rights are
terminable by a landowner or whether termination can occur as a result
of the actions of a third party. Because, at any time, the taxpayer is not
legally entitled to any determinable portion of the mineral in place, the
taxpayer obtained only an economic advantage from the agreement.
Accordingly, in the present case, the taxpayer, upon entering into
the mineral lease with the landowner for the quarrying of rock required
to fulfill the contract with the governmental agency, did not acquire an
economic interest in mineral in place within the meaning of section
1.611-1(b) of the regulations because the duration of the mineral lease
was so related to taxpayer's construction contract with the governmental
agency that the lease was terminable at the will of the governmental
agency.
78 602 F.2d at 351.
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22
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol83/iss2/3
PERCENTAGE DEPLETION
miner, wanted to be able to terminate the contract as soon as a
road building project could be obtained.7
Furthermore, in Weaver, Mullins, and Whitmer, just as in
Swank, the right to terminate without cause on short notice was
merely a condition subsequent; and until that right was exercised,
the lessees had every right, opportunity, and risk in carrying on
their operations that a lessee would have under a lease without
such a termination clause.80 In fact, Black Hawk and Bull Run
mined their coal to exhaustion without any exercise of the termi-
nation clauses which are the focal point of this article.81
By placing emphasis on the fact that certain lease arrange-
ments are subject to short-notice terminations, the Tax Court, at
least, has put itself in a position of having to determine how long
is short. What difference should it make whether a taxpayer who
has a leasehold interest in the minerals in place and who has to
look to the market to recover his investment holds that lease sub-
ject to a short-notice without-cause termination clause? As long
as he owns that leasehold, he has all the right, title and interest
to mine the coal and sell it to whomever he pleases. Under
Palmer, that constitutes an economic interest although it may not
last more than one day.ss
7' 359 U.S. at 217.
,0 Bakertown Coal Co. v. United States, 485 F.2d 633, 641 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Mul-
lins v. Commissioner, dissent, 48 T.C. 571, 585 (1967).
81 With respect to Black Hawk see the stipulation of facts at page 71a of the
Joint Appendix. With respect to Bull Run see Respondent's Brief at page 2.
82 While it is highly unlikely that any such leasehold interest would ever be
negotiated which was to last only a day, logically, at least with respect to percent-
age depletion, the interest transferred by the lessor to the lessee which entitles the
lessee to mine exclusively and look to the market for his return of capital should
be a valid economic interest for whatever time the lease is effective. Judge Dren-
nen so noted succinctly in his dissent in Mullins v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 571,
584-85 (1967):
If the only question here was whether the lesspr or the lessees were
entitled to the depletion deduction, I would have no hesitancy in saying
that the lessees were entitled to it. This is because I think the lessor
surrendered all or part of his economic interest in the coal under the
Boiling tract to the lessee while the lease was in effect; and we are con-
cerned with depletion on coal that was mined while the lease was
effective.
But there is no question that the case law and the Commissioner's
regulations have engrafted on the requirements of the law that to be
1980]
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The termination clauses in Swank were never exercised over
the period during which the taxpayers mined the coal under the
leases.83 Quite clearly, then, the lessees in fact had interests in the
coal in place which permitted them to mine the coal to exhaus-
tion. Until the termination clauses were exercised, the lessees had
the requisite economic interest to permit their taking the deple-
tion allowance,84 for "the mere existence of the unused termina-
entitled to a deduction for depletion the taxpayer must have an eco-
nomic interest in the mineral deposits. I agree with the majority that the
petitioners had an economic interest in the coal underlying the Blair
and Clintwood leases, for the reasons stated in the opinion. I cannot
agree that they had any less economic interest in the coal underlying the
Boiling lease; the only difference was that their interest under the
Bolling lease was subject to divestment if the lessor exercised his right
to terminate. Until such time as the lessor exercised that right, in my
opinion petitioners had such an economic interest in the coal deposit
that would support the depletion deduction. If the lessor exercised his
right to terminate, the entire economic interest would then revert to the
lessor. But we are not here concerned with coal mined after that time.
This suggested shifting of the economic interest in a mineral de-
posit is not unusual. Under the pertinent regulation it occurs any time a
taxpayer acquires by investment any interest in the mineral in place and
secures, by any form of legal relationship, income derived from the ex-
traction of the mineral, to which he must look for a return of his capital.
Indeed the conclusion of the majority must recognize the possibility of
such a shift in economic interest under the Clintwood lease, because af-
ter the original 2-year term thereof the lessor has the absolute right to
terminate the lease on short notice without cause and, according to the
theory of the majority, the economic interest in the coal in the Clint-
wood lease, which had theretofore rested in the lessee, would revert to
the lessor.
Where, because of the uncertain terms of a mineral lease or con-
tract, it is difficult to determine whether the lessee or contractor is sim-
ply mining the coal for the lessor for a fee or fixed price, or whether the
lessor has actually surrendered his economic interest in the coal to the
lessee, the presence of a short termination clause, considered along with
the other terms of the agreement, would usually be entitled to consider-
able weight. But I do not believe it should be a conclusive factor in de-
termining that the petitioners here, who obviously had an economic in-
terest in the coal deposit and had to look to the extraction and sale of
that coal for their profit, were not entitled to the depletion deduction
solely because of the termination clause in the Boiling lease.
602 F.2d at 350.
4 See note 82, supra.
24
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol83/iss2/3
PERCENTAGE DEPLETION
tion clause is not enough to deprive the taxpayer/lessees of their
'economic interest' they would otherwise have."8 5 This statement
is based on the economic reality that, until the termination clause
is exercised, the lessee has every right to mine the coal and sell it
on the open market, taking the risk of profit or loss upon itself.
The lessee under these circumstances is in no different position
(and thus should not be penalized) from a lessee operating under
a lease without such a termination clause.8
In Swank the court dealt with economic substance and not
technical form. The court looked to the records and found:
that each of the taxpayers had regularly mined coal from the
leases in question for a very substantial period prior to the
taxable years [footnote omitted] and that, in all reality, they
had a very good expectation of being able to continue to do
so .... [W]e accept the showing that the lessors rarely (if
ever) terminated without cause, not as demonstrating that the
lessors lacked the legal power to terminate without cause [foot-
note omitted], but solely as showing that in practice and in
reality the plaintiff coal-lessees had, at all revelant times, a
solid expectation that they could continue under their leases to
mine the coal for a substantial period and to extract a substan-
tial amount of the coal [footnote omitted]. This means-unless
85 Id.
86 As is suggested in the Mullins dissent, until the termination power is exer-
cised the lessee has an enforceable leasehold interest.
Suppose two coal operators each had the same leasehold interest, for instance,
as Swank (see note 51 supra for the details in the Bull Run lease) except that one
lease said nothing about termination on short notice without cause. They each
mine coal pursuant to the leases for 15 years and sell it on the open market. Dur-
ing this 15 year period the termination power is never exercised. In economic real-
ity those two coal operators are in idential positions and have identical leasehold
interests so long as the termination power is not exercised. To say that one is
entitled to depletion and the other is not creates gross inequity between two simi-
larly situated taxpayers, particularly where, as happened in Black Hawk and Bull
Run, the coal deposits were in fact mined to exhaustion without exercise of the
termination clause. If and when the termination power is exercised, then the ques-
tion of depletion disappears with respect to the lessee whose leasehold interest no
longer exists.
The same comparison could be made for shorter periods, but the time refer-
ence used is close to the facts of Swank. As pointed out in note 82 supra, the
analysis should apply to a leasehold interest of one day. This analysis should ap-
ply also to a situation where the lessee has the right to terminate on short notice
without cause, which was the case in Swank.
1980]
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we are to depart from defendant's own norm for testing 'eco-
nomic interest' by substance and reality, rather than by mere
nomenclature or the theoretical form of the legal arrange-
ment-that taxpayers are entitled to depletion. They satisfy
the proffered criterion of knowing in advance that they will be
able to mine for a substantial period and to extract a substan-
tial portion of the coal. Certainly this was true at the begin-
ning of each of the taxable years.87
In Bakertown the court also indicated that economic reality
must be taken into consideration:
The property interest represented by that authority [thait is,
the authority over extraction and sale of minerals given pursu-
ant to leases] is not varied or diminished simply because the
authority is subject to the possibility of extinction in the fu-
ture by a termination of the leases on short notice. The legal
effect of a termination on these leases is no less prospective
because the advanced notice requirement is only 30 days, than
it would be if the specified period were one year.8'
Further, there was no danger that if the lessors could obtain
better royalties they would terminate the leases. Even though it is
a fact that the market had increased substantially, no such action
was ever taken because business judgment dictated that the les-
sors remain bound under the then existing leases.' 9
Based on the reality that 1) the lessees mined the deposits to
exhaustion (or for a substantial period of time) without exercise
of the termination clause by the lessors, 2) apparently the lessors
and lessees never had any intention of exercising these clauses,
1* 602 F.2d at 351. The court disposes of the terminability issue entirely on
the ground of economic reality, not refuting the "mining-to-exhaustion" argument
of the government on any theoretical basis.
485 F.2d at 636.
602 F.2d at 351, n.9:
We were told at oral argument by counsel for one of the plaintiffs
that lessors have not terminated, even though the value of coal has in-
creased markedly in the recent past and the royalties fixed in the leases
now seem "outdated," because, for a new lessee, the costs of continuing
with an existing mine are usually so great, comparatively, that it is diffi-
cult for a lessor to obtain new lessees at terms more favorable to the
lessors than the existing leases. We do not accept this as evidence, but
the record contains nothing to contradict this explanation for what
seems to be the fact that leases of this type have not been regularly
cancelled by lessors in recent years.
[Vol. 83
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and 3) even though the price for coal had risen dramatically, the
lessors never terminated the leases, the termination clauses had
no true independent economic significance.
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has an opportunity now to
put back in order the concept of "economic interest" and the ef-
fect of clauses providing for termination without cause on short
notice on that concept. The confusion has grown out of the use of
termination clauses as an aid to contract miners who had no
traditional investment in coal in place, to serve as a basis for
claiming the depletion deduction. Parsons and Paragon stand for
the proposition that contract miners have no "economic interest"
regardless of the presence or absence of a termination clause. Ter-
mination clauses have now been turned around by the, Internal
Revenue Service as a weapon to deny bona fide lessees, who un-
questionably have an investment in the coal in place, a depletion
deduction to which they are clearly entitled. The Court should
follow the precedent set by the Court of Claims and the Fifth
Circuit and (1) base its holding on the original requirements of an
economic interest as set forth in Palmer, (2) show that termina-
tion without cause or for cause is a neutral factor in finding
whether an "economic interest" exists with respect to a bona fide
leasehold interest, and (3) articulate the critical distinction be-
tween contract miners who perform services only for a fixed price
with no investment in the coal in place and bona fide lessees who
have an investment in the coal in place and who, in order to re-
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